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Abstract: 
 
The experience in the period during and after the Asian crisis of 1997-98 has provoked an 
extensive debate about the credit rating agencies’ evaluation of sovereign risk in emerging 
markets lending. This study analyzes the role of credit rating agencies in international finan-
cial markets, particularly whether sovereign credit ratings have an impact on the financial 
stability in emerging market economies. The event study and panel regression results indicate 
that credit rating agencies have substantial influence on the size and volatility of emerging 
markets lending. The empirical results are significantly stronger in the case of government’s 
downgrades and negative imminent sovereign credit rating actions such as credit watches and 
rating outlooks than positive adjustments by the credit rating agencies while by the market 
participants’ anticipated sovereign credit rating changes have a smaller impact on financial 
markets in emerging economies. 
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I Introduction 
 
 
“There are two superpowers in the world today in my opinion. 
There’s the United States and there’s Moody’s Bond Rating Service. 
The United States can destroy you by dropping bombs, and Moody’s 
can destroy you by downgrading your bonds. And believe me, it’s not 
clear sometimes who’s more powerful.”
1 
 
During the 1990s, global securities markets have become an increasingly important source of 
external funding for many emerging market countries. As a result, the portfolio preferences of 
institutional investors have been vital determinants of the scale and composition of capital 
flows to emerging markets, and of the terms and conditions under which those markets can be 
accessed. In this regard, credit rating agencies such as Standard & Poor’s (S&P) and Moody’s 
Investors Service (Moody’s) have been perceived by both market participants and 
policymakers as having a strong impact on both the cost of funding and the willingness of 
institutional investors to hold certain types of financial instruments. 
The severe adjustments of sovereign credit ratings for many emerging market 
economies throughout the Asian financial crisis of 1997-98 have raised anxiety about the 
credit rating process and in particular about the usefulness of sovereign credit ratings.
2 
Indeed, critics have argued that the improvements in sovereign credit ratings during the first 
half of the 1990s and the subsequent sharp declines in the latter half initiated a pro-cyclical 
element into global capital flows by accelerating capital inflows during the mid-1990s and 
contributing to the collapse of these inflows after the Asian crisis emerged. To examine these 
concerns, this study analyzes the specific experience with sovereign credit ratings for 
emerging markets in the second half of the 1990s. 
The reminder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II explores the role of credit 
rating agencies in international financial markets. First to be considered is the credit rating 
agencies’ concept of sovereign risk and default and presents the criteria and methodology 
underlying their sovereign credit risk assessments. Furthermore, the importance of credit 
ratings for institutional investors is considered. Section III investigates, in a detailed empirical 
study, the question whether credit rating agencies may aggravate the dynamics of financial 
                                                 
1   This quotation is taken from a comment by FRIEDMAN (1999) in the New York Times Magazine. 
2   See for a detailed discussion Kräussl (2003).  
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market crises. This aspect is imperative in emerging markets where investor confidence is not 
particularly strong. Moreover, investor’s behavior is more volatile, given that some 
institutional investors are constrained to hold securities that have been classified as 
investment-grade by the credit rating agencies as a result of either official regulations or 
banks’ internal risk management practices. 
This study complements earlier research on the impact of sovereign credit rating 
changes on financial markets in emerging economies in many ways. Most of the previous 
studies, for instance REISEN  AND  VON MALTZAN (1999), have focused on quantifying the 
effects of changes in country ratings on sovereign risk as measured by the yield spreads of 
domestic financial instruments relative to mature market benchmarks. However, they have not 
scrutinized whether credit rating changes for one type of security have an effect on other asset 
markets within and across national borders. Consequently, this study specifies an index of 
speculative market pressure consisting of daily changes in the nominal exchange rate, daily 
changes of the short-term interest rate, and daily changes in the major national stock market 
index. In addition, the empirical analysis also investigates the potential impact of changes in 
the US short-term interest rate on financial markets in emerging market economies as sugges-
ted, for example, by EICHENGREEN AND MODY (1998) and CALVO AND MENDOZA (2000a). 
In contrast to the recent analysis by KAMINSKY AND SCHMUKLER (2002), this empirical 
study examines not only implemented sovereign credit rating changes, but also imminent 
rating actions by the agencies, such as credit watches and rating outlooks. In addition, it 
analyzes whether anticipated or unanticipated and whether contaminated or uncontaminated 
sovereign credit rating actions have a stronger effect on the financial markets of emerging 
market countries. As a result of the rapid growth in the agencies’ sovereign risk assessments, 
such a detailed analysis has only recently become feasible. 
Section IV presents the empirical results. To study the effects between sovereign credit 
ratings and a country’s financial market vulnerability, two different methodologies have been 
applied. First, event studies are employed to get an idea of any possible dynamic effects after 
the agencies’ sovereign credit rating actions, and then panel regressions are estimated to get a 
sense of probable contemporaneous effects following the changes in the sovereign credit 
ratings. Section V concludes and presents an outlook. 
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II  The Role of Credit Rating Agencies in International Financial Markets 
II.1  Financial Markets, Asymmetric Information and  
Credit Rating Agencies 
The historical logic underlying the existence of credit rating agencies has clearly resided 
within the basic problem of financial markets: asymmetric information. Credit rating agencies 
can play a useful role in financial decision-making by providing market participants with 
information about the credit risk associated with different financial investments. Borrowers 
commonly seek credit ratings to facilitate their own access to global capital markets since 
many international investors prefer rated securities over non-assessed securities of apparently 
similar credit risk. In addition, the agencies’ risk assessments on external debt are vital 
because numerous institutional investors are constrained to hold only investment-grade rated 
bonds in their portfolios. 
Credit rating agencies provide standardized evaluations of the likely risks and returns 
associated with alternative investments according to standardized creditworthiness 
categories.
3 They assign credit ratings for the purpose of generating information about default 
probabilities that are pertinent for pricing and hedging risky fixed-income securities of 
corporate, municipal and sovereign issuers. Credit rating agencies supply market participants 
with a system of relative creditworthiness of all bond issues by incorporating all the 
components of default risk into a single code: the credit rating. However, the choice 
concerning the investments to be undertaken remains with the investor. The cost of producing 
such information is imposed through fees on the issuers of rated securities and is not related to 
sales of particular financial products. 
WHITE (2002) points out that since credit rating agencies’ judgments are widely 
disseminated, broadly used, and unmistakably understood by market participants, they can 
open the issuer’s debt to a wider range of prospective investors. In nowadays global financial 
markets, a credit rating can provide access to international capital, for instance, in debt 
markets where the issuer is not well-known or where investors may not be familiar with the 
issuer’s language, its business culture or its accounting standards. 
MERRILL LYNCH (1999) accentuates that credit rating agencies can assist lenders to 
“pierce the fog” of asymmetric information that surrounds lending relationships. Equivalently, 
                                                 
3   While there are several credit rating agencies, the industry is dominated by just two who operate in global 
financial markets: S&P and Moody’s. Reflecting this supremacy, the following discussion and analysis is for 
the most part confined to these two businesses.  
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credit rating agencies can help borrowers and their credit qualities to emerge from that same 
fog. In the case of government bonds, for instance, where thousands of lenders may possess 
the obligation of a single issuer, credit rating agencies can reduce or eradicate the replication 
of information-generation efforts in which individual bondholders might otherwise engage. 
The BANK FOR INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS (2000) clarifies that this also implies that credit 
ratings allow holders of relatively small shares to forestall the high per unit costs that their 
own investigations otherwise might necessitate. 
 
II.2  The Increasing Significance of Sovereign Credit Ratings 
In recent years, the request for sovereign credit ratings, i.e., the risk assessments assigned by 
the credit rating agencies to the obligations of central governments, has increased 
considerably. By reducing investor uncertainty about risk exposures, sovereign credit ratings 
have enabled many governments, even some with former histories of debt default, to once 
more gain access to international bond markets. 
Even though the credit rating agencies’ current practice of assigning credit ratings for 
sovereign risk originated on the whole only a few decades ago, Moody’s has been evaluating 
foreign governments’ bonds since 1919. According to OBSTFELD AND TAYLOR (2003), 
international bond markets were extremely dynamic in the early part of the twentieth century. 
By 1929, Moody’s was evaluating bonds issued by roughly 50 central governments. The 
demands for sovereign credit ratings, however, subsided with the arrival of the Great 
Depression, and after the Second World War the international bond markets came to a 
standstill. 
In the 1970s international bond markets revitalized, but the demand for sovereign credit 
ratings was slow to materialize. MOODY’S INVESTORS SERVICE (2001) points out that about 15 
years ago merely 15 foreign governments, which borrowed in the US capital markets, 
considered the need to obtain a sovereign credit rating. For the reason that these governments 
were in effect all sound borrowers from industrial countries, their sovereign risk assessments 
were quite straightforward and non-controversial. During these times other governments were 
able to achieve international financing through other resources. According to CANTOR AND 
PACKER (1995), a few financially strong governments gained access to international capital 
through European markets without holding a sovereign credit rating. They observe that less 
creditworthy sovereigns frequently achieved international credit from commercial banks, and  
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a small number of governments issued privately placed bonds without retaining a credit risk 
assessment by the credit rating agencies. 
While the credit rating agencies evaluated the financial and economic soundness of 
countries, banks, companies, and security issues of industrialized countries for a long while, 
only during the last decade have they paid closer attention to the rating of credit risk 
associated with emerging market economies. However, PARTNOY (2002) points out that one 
should not construe this behavior of the credit rating agencies as having left a vacuum in 
central regions of the world. Throughout the 1970s and 1980s international financing was first 
and foremost channeled through major commercial banks which were supposed to have the 
capability to separately observe and assess the creditworthiness of sovereign borrowers. 
SYLLA (2002), for example, argues that in domestic markets the prevalent relationship among 
commercial banks and their customers to the international sphere left little space for the work 
of profitable credit rating agencies. 
Table 1 illustrates that over the last decade Moody’s has seen more than a fivefold 
growth in the number of emerging market sovereigns that have received a credit rating on 
their long-term foreign currency debt issues. 
Table 1:  Moody’s Emerging Market Sovereign Credit Ratings by Region 
(1993 to 2000) 
Year 
Region 
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
Asia  6  7  10 10 10 11 11 11 
Latin America  4 6 7 7 9  13  14  14 
Middle East  1 1 1 9  10  11  11  11 
Transition Economies  1 2 2 4  12  15  16  16 
Others  0 1 4 5 8  10  12  12 
Total  12 17 24 35 49 60 64 64 
 
Table 1 indicates that in 1993 only 12 emerging market economies were assessed by 
Moody’s. The number of rated governments accelerated rapidly in the mid-1990s, as several 
governments, particularly transition economies and countries in the Middle East, sought 
access to international bond markets. 
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II.3  Sovereign Credit Ratings 
The agencies interpret their sovereign credit ratings as forward-looking indications of the 
relative risk that a sovereign debt issuer will not have the ability and willingness to make full 
and timely payments of principal and interest over the life of a particular rated financial 
instrument. Sovereign credit risk analysis may be divided into two broad components, 
specifically economic and political risk. Economic risk deals with the government’s ability to 
repay its obligations on time and is a function of both qualitative and quantitative factors, 
while political risk addresses the sovereign’s willingness to repay its outstanding debt on 
time. For example, STANDARD  & POOR’S (1997) divides the factors which influence the 
determination of the overall sovereign credit rating into eight categories: political risk, income 
and economic structure, economic growth prospects, fiscal flexibility, public debt burden, 
price stability, balance of payments flexibility, and external debt and liquidity.
4 
Despite the fact that the agencies list the relevant political and economic factors that 
underlie their sovereign credit ratings, they provide no information about the weights they 
assign to each factor and the role of non-quantifiable criteria such as government stability and 
policy consensus. The credit rating agencies underline that they do not employ a specific 
formula to combine their assessments of political and economic factors to derive the overall 
rating (see STANDARD & POOR’S (1999) and MOODY’S INVESTORS SERVICE (2001)). 
For assigning their sovereign credit ratings the agencies apply an ordinal scale. S&P’s 
ratings for long-term foreign currency bonds run from AAA, the highest, through AA, A, and 
BBB, and then all the way down to CC. Similarly, Moody’s sovereign credit ratings range 
from that the sovereign is fairly unlikely to default (Aaa) down to that it has a relatively high 
risk of default (C).
5 Sovereign credit ratings are also subject to refinements. S&P’s sovereign 
credit ratings from double-A to triple-C may be modified by the addition of a plus or a minus 
to show their relative standing within the major rating categories. Moody’s applies for this 
reason numerical modifiers 1, 2 and 3 in each rating category from double-A to Caa. 
In recent years, both S&P and Moody’s have supplemented their credit risk as-
sessments with credit watches and rating outlooks, respectively, designed to indicate the 
credit rating agencies’ perspectives on developments that might induce a rating change. But as 
                                                 
4   Table A1 in the Appendix illustrates in detail the political and economic factors S&P focuses on when rating 
sovereigns. 
5   See Tables A2 and A3 in the Appendix for a detailed description of the long-term issuer sovereign credit 
rating scales of S&P and Moody’s, respectively.   
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STANDARD & POOR’S (2000) points out, it is central to understand that a rating outlook or a 
credit watch is not necessarily an antecedent of a rating change.
6 
Credit ratings are often separated into two broad categories, i.e., investment-grade and 
speculative- or non-investment-grade. MERRILL  LYNCH (1999) mentions that investment-
grade issues are typically considered to be appropriate investments for institutional investors. 
S&P’s issues rated BBB−  and above are investment-grade, while Moody’s split is made at 
Baa3. This differentiation has an essential role for institutional investors since the majority of 
them operate within restrictive limitations on the risk of financial instruments in their 
portfolio. In some cases these are absolute constraints: a manager of an investment-grade 
bond portfolio may be precluded from trading bonds that are not classified as investment-
grade. 
As a consequence, a sovereign credit rating upgrade to investment-grade is vital since it 
opens up a much wider investor base by making the bonds appropriate for enclosure in 
benchmark investment-grade indexes. This implicates that the sovereign credit rating upgrade 
will result in both increased and more stable demand for bonds of that particular emerging 
market. On the other hand, when an issuer receives a credit rating below-investment-grade, 
the number of potential investors radically declines. However, such a credit rating-effect is to 
some extent incorporated into the pricing of the country’s debt concurrently with the news 
that the sovereign credit rating will be placed on review for a possible upgrade.
7  
Furthermore, through the so-called “sovereign ceiling”, however, the sovereign credit 
rating has a major influence on the credit risk assignments for all other domestic entities. 
STANDARD  & POOR’S (1997) and MOODY’S  INVESTORS  SERVICE  (1999) record that until 
recently, the sovereign credit rating set a ceiling on the credit risk assessment that could be 
achieved by other domestic entities, under the assumption that the sovereign has the first 
                                                 
6   MOODY’S INVESTORS SERVICE (2001) mentions that it is crucial to discriminate between a credit watch and a 
rating outlook. Both are intended to communicate the agencies’ credit opinion to the market participants, but 
each contains different information and has separate rating implications. Credit watches are part of the formal 
committee-based rating process by which the agencies’ credit ratings are assigned, monitored and changed 
over time. In contrast, as the agencies emphasize, a change in the rating outlook is neither a rating change nor 
a review for a potential credit rating change. Therefore, a rating outlook may be considered as a useful early 
indicator, but as a weaker signal than a credit watch. 
7   This reflects the demand both from investment-grade portfolio managers that have some flexibility to make 
allocations to non-investment-grade assets, and from unconstrained investors, for example high-yield portfo-
lio managers and hedge funds. These institutional investors are able to purchase opportunistically and realize 
much of the prize impact of the credit rating upgrade and subsequently sell after the actual upgrade to other 
investors who have not had the flexibility to buy prior to the actual inclusion in investment-grade indexes.  
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claim on available foreign exchange reserves and controls the ability of any resident entity to 
get hold of international funds to compensate lenders.
8 
 
III  Sovereign Credit Ratings and Their Impact on Financial Stability in 
Emerging Market Economies 
A number of empirical studies tried to shed light on the issue of whether credit rating agencies 
have a significant influence on financial markets by using event study approaches, Granger 
causality analysis and vector autoregressive (VAR) modeling, respectively. However, through 
examining the relationship between changes in sovereign credit ratings and movements in 
bond yield spreads between domestic US dollar-denominated Eurobonds and comparable US 
treasury bonds, somewhat disparate results have been obtained. 
CANTOR AND PACKER (1996) study the effects of sovereign credit rating an-
nouncements on government bond yield spreads, using daily data covering the periods before 
and after the 79 rating announcements in their sample of 35 industrial and emerging market 
countries. They conclude that announcements of sovereign credit rating upgrades were 
followed by statistically significant deteriorations in government bond yield spreads, but 
sovereign credit rating downgrades did not produce significant rating effects. Moreover, the 
impact of sovereign credit rating announcements on government bond yield spreads was 
much stronger for speculative-grade than for investment-grade sovereigns. 
REISEN AND VON MALTZAN (1999) also undertake an event study and make use of data 
on 29 countries from 1989 to 1997 including 152 sovereign credit rating announcements. 
They find that a significant rating effect in the government bond yield spread in the expected 
direction occurred only when a country was put on review for possible downgrade. These 
results are in sharp contrast to those of CANTOR AND PACKER (1996), who found sizeable 
rating effects only for positive sovereign credit rating announcements. Nonetheless, one 
similarity between these two empirical studies is that REISEN AND VON MALTZAN (1999) 
conclude that the largest rating effects are for emerging market sovereign yield spreads, which 
are usually of lower credit quality, i.e., below investment-grade. In addition, the authors test 
for Granger causality and find a causal relationship in both directions. Consequently, they are 
                                                 
8   For instance, when Moody’s downgraded Japan’s long-term foreign currency rating on November 18, 1998, 
from Aaa to Aa1, all other triple-A rated Japanese issuers were also downgraded by one rating-notch. This 
credit rating boundary of the sovereign ceiling can generate a fundamental problem for companies located in 
countries that have political or financial instabilities, but which would otherwise have high corporate credit 
ratings.  
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unconvinced that credit rating agencies lead international financial markets. Instead, they 
argue that sovereign credit rating assignments lag the government bond markets, thereby 
intensifying boom-bust cycles in emerging markets lending. 
KRÄUSSL (2000), employing a later sample period that fully captures the financial 
turbulences in emerging market countries during the latter half of the 1990s, examines the 
link between sovereign credit rating announcements and government bond yield spreads by 
using a VAR model. Contrary to previous studies, he concludes that the empirical results 
suggest an unexpected sovereign credit rating change does not necessarily have an immediate 
impact on emerging market bond yield spreads. Nevertheless, all empirical studies conclude 
that sovereign credit ratings appear to provide additional information beyond that contained in 
government bond yield spreads, but lag rather than lead international financial markets. 
 
III.1 Theory  and  Hypotheses 
There are two alternative views about the informational value of the agencies’ credit ratings. 
One view is that credit rating agencies only have access to publicly available information and 
that the agencies generally lag the financial markets in processing that information. 
Proponents of this viewpoint reason that the frequency with which credit rating agencies 
review corporate and sovereign issuers is too low even to generate appropriate summaries of 
relevant public information (see GROPP AND RICHARDS (2001)). According to this 
argumentation, credit rating changes should not affect market prices, if financial markets are 
efficient in semi-strong form. 
An alternative view is that credit rating agencies are specialists at obtaining and 
processing information, and thereby generate information on issuers’ default risk that was not 
previously in the financial markets. A negative credit rating announcement might induce 
institutional investors to rebalance their portfolios for risk management, liquidity and/or other 
reasons. Sovereign credit rating changes may also reveal new information about a country and 
thus may encourage financial market rallies or downturns. This rating effect is likely to be 
stronger in emerging markets, where problems of asymmetric information and transparency 
are more severe. 
Proponents of the asymmetric information framework emphasize that in financial 
markets information acquisition and processing is subject to free-rider problems, which can 
be aggravated in the wake of a (rating) shock event. CALVO AND MENDOZA (2000b), for  
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example, argue that because of the high costs of generating information, most market 
participants prefer to follow a handful of supposedly informed investors and financial 
analysts. As a result, the financial market will be subject to rumors and will exhibit herding 
behavior, since less informed investors choose mistakenly but rationally to “follow the herd” 
if they are evaluated based on their relative performance vis-à-vis other portfolio managers. 
These growing informational asymmetries might lead in the aftermath of a (rating) shock 
event to a homogeneously negative perception of overall credit quality so that creditors ulti-
mately will withdraw their funds. 
This sort of collective action problem multiplies the likelihood of large swings in 
international capital flows in the absence of any substantial changes in the countries’ 
economic fundamentals. WYPLOSZ (1998) indicates that the essential reason for the existence 
of this phenomenon is that when financial markets act on the basis of expectations of a 
particular outcome, they are strong enough to actually provoke this particular outcome. But 
what makes this phenomenon particularly puzzling is that expectations that are ex-ante 
reasonable are validated ex-post by the outcome that they have generated, implying they can 
be self-fulfilling. As a consequence, dramatic losses can be directly caused by the financial 
market exit lenders who suspect that the financial position of their debtors is considerably 
distressed. 
An essential implication of the model by CALVO AND MENDOZA (2000b) is that 
credible financial market institutions which ease the process of extracting information from 
noise will tend to moderate emerging market countries’ vulnerability to external shocks. 
Credit rating agencies are designed exclusively for the task of overcoming such informational 
asymmetries. Their fundamental responsibility is to release early warnings so that investors 
can reach well-timed financial markets (exit) decisions. 
Credit rating agencies have been sharply criticized by both academics and market 
participants as promoters of financial market turbulences. For example, FERRI, LIU AND 
STIGLITZ (1999) argue that the credit rating agencies’ pro-cyclical behavior, that is upgrading 
sovereigns in good financial market conditions and downgrading them in turbulent times, may 
have contributed to deepen the observed boom-bust pattern in global financial markets. 
REISEN AND VON MALTZAN (1999) emphasize that this potential financial market impact of 
sovereign credit ratings would be crucial to their power to moderate, through well-timed 
credit rating actions or intensify through too late credit risk adjustments, boom-bust cycles in 
emerging markets lending cycles. The authors argue that, during the boom, an appropriate  
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lowering of the sovereign’s credit rating would help to diminish euphoric market sentiment. 
This in turn would help to tone down private short-term capital inflows which have over and 
over again been recognized as promoters of credit-lending booms and financial vulnerability 
in emerging market economies. 
Beyond this issue of market power, there is also the persistent question of whether the 
credit rating agencies generate any additional informational value for the financial markets. 
Credit ratings might merely be reflecting financial market outcomes rather than the other way 
around. Therefore, in the following it will be examined whether a change in the sovereign 
credit rating causes a significant change in financial markets, implying that the credit rating 
change is providing new information to the market participants, or whether the financial 
market variables remain relatively unaffected, indicating that the market participants already 
captured the change in the country’s underlying economic conditions that motivated the 
sovereign credit rating adjustment. 
 
III.2 Methodology 
For assessing the characteristics of the emerging market countries that have been affected 
during the financial crises in the latter half of the 1990s, an operational definition of 
speculative market pressure is required. In contrast to previous empirical studies, for example 
REISEN AND VON MALTZAN (1999) and KAMINSKY AND SCHMUKLER (2002), which try to 
analyze the influence of credit rating agencies on emerging market crises by looking solely at 
the effects of sovereign credit rating actions on government bond yield spreads, this index of 
speculative market pressure should not contain government bond yield spreads for several 
central reasons. Firstly, many of the emerging market economies do not have well-developed 
domestic financial markets implying that the construction of a reliable and comparable data 
set on government bond yield spreads is a problematical task, given the low liquidity of the 
sovereign bonds. 
Secondly, there is the general issue that government bonds are typically less liquid than 
stocks, and that the reported prices are often indicative quotes rather than actual trades. It can 
be very difficult to get accurate up-to-date pricing of all but a few benchmark issues. Previous 
empirical studies make also the factual error that they consider for their whole investigation 
and estimation period only a single sovereign bond, despite the fact that the maturity structure 
of these government bonds changes over time. Finally, especially during financial crisis  
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episodes many of these emerging market governments’ bonds are not traded on a regular basis 
and therefore not accurately priced. 
In following the approach by FRANKEL AND ROSE (1996), a financial crisis could be 
identified simply as a substantial nominal currency devaluation. But this criterion would rule 
out instances where a currency came under severe pressure but the country’s authorities 
successfully defended it by intervening vigorously in the foreign exchange market and/or by 
raising interest rates sharply. Nonetheless, many such occurrences would reasonably be 
considered as financial crises. An alternative approach would be to construct an index of 
speculative pressure that takes into account not only nominal exchange rate movements but 
also changes in international reserves and/or domestic interest rates that absorb financial 
market pressure and as a result moderate the nominal exchange rate changes (see 
EICHENGREEN, ROSE AND WYPLOSZ (1996)). 
But (financial) shocks may not be confined only to a single market, such as foreign 
exchange, and may have more far-reaching consequences by having a substantial effect on 
domestic money and equity markets. Many popular explanations for the Asian crisis of 1997-
98 emphasize the relationship between equity and currency markets in the crisis-ridden 
emerging market economies.
9  
AZIZ, CARAMAZZA AND SALGADO (2000) lay emphasis on that interest rate movements 
have played a significant role either in triggering or in preventing financial market crises, both 
directly through their effects on international capital flows and indirectly as a signal of the 
country’s authorities’ commitment to defend an exchange rate peg. They show that prior to 
the financial crises in emerging markets during the latter half of the 1990s, the real interest 
rate moved sharply upwards. DRAZEN (2003) points out that a major effect of high interest 
rates is the signal of the government’s willingness or ability to defend the exchange rate. He 
                                                 
9   For example, CORSETTI, PESENTI AND ROUBINI (1999) point out that the collapse in the Southeast Asian 
equity markets has led to the outflow of foreign investments which in turn put downward pressure on the 
domestic currencies. In addition, RADELET AND SACHS (1998) notice that especially during the Asian crisis, 
financial market breakdowns have been closely associated with the collapse of asset prices. They reason that 
the increase in non-performing loans and capital losses caused by the currency depreciation sharply reduced 
the commercial banks’ available capital, by this means forcing commercial banks to selling assets and re-
ducing lending in order to move towards capital adequacy ratios required by regulators and the IMF. 
HARTMANN, STRAETMANS AND DE VRIES (2001) indicate that because stock market returns are proxies for 
expectations of future profitability in the economy, their movements may be as reflective of adjustments in 
investors’ perceptions of sovereign credit risk as movements in government bond yield spreads.  
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notes that a frequently used measure to prevent existing financial market speculation is to 
increase short-term interest rates.
10  
Therefore, as the financial crises in the latter half of the 1990s have shown, when an 
emerging market economy suffers a deep financial crisis all domestic financial markets are 
affected at the same time: the currency weakens, domestic interest rates increase and stock 
market indexes slide. This implies that a convenient indicator of speculative market pressure 
in emerging markets financial crises should be broadened to include foreign exchange rate 
pressures as well as pressures in other financial markets such as movements in domestic 
short-term interest rates and domestic equity prices. 
As a measure of financial market crises, hence, an index of speculative market pressure 
is specified as a weighted average of daily nominal exchange rate changes, daily short-term 
interest rate changes and daily stock market changes. The resulting index of a country’s i 
daily speculative market pressure at time t is given through 
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where  it e  denotes the first differences of the nominal exchange rate, that is the price of 
one US dollar in country i’s currency at time t,  it r  denotes the first differences of the 
domestic short-term interest rate,  it s  denotes the first differences of the domestic main stock 
market index, and  1 a ,  2 a  and  3 a  are the weights assigned to these three factors, respectively. 
The relationship between the nominal exchange rate and the sovereign credit rating 
should be negative, indicating that a lower sovereign risk assessment should be connected 
with a higher nominal exchange rate. The relationship between the short-term interest rate and 
the sovereign credit rating should also be negative, which indicates that a negative sovereign 
credit rating action should be associated with rising short-term interest rates. Since negative 
sovereign credit rating announcements should be associated with positive movements in the 
index of speculative market pressure, the relative changes in the domestic stock market prices 
indexes are multiplied by − 1. 
                                                 
10  For example, Hong Kong SAR raised overnight interest rates to several hundred percent and successfully 
defended its currency in October 1997 against a mounting speculative attack. On the contrary, Sweden 
similarly raised its short-term interest rate by several hundred percent in its currency defense during the EMS 
crisis in September 1992, but its success was only short-lived.  
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A higher speculative market pressure index SMP indicates greater pressure on the 
financial markets in country i at day t since it will be mirrored in higher values of the three 
components. Insofar as sovereign credit ratings convey new information to market 
participants, the expected rating effect on the index of speculative market pressure is 
straightforward: in case of a sovereign credit rating downgrade the index should rise, while in 
the occurrence of a sovereign credit rating upgrade the SMP should fall. 
A crucial step is weighting the three components of the speculative market pressure 
index of equation (1). An obvious choice would be an unweighted average which the 
advantage of simplicity. Such a weighting would reflect a preference to identify which 
component causes the principal change in the speculative market pressure index. But since the 
volatility of nominal exchange rates, short-term interest rates and stock market indexes is very 
different, the components are weighted instead so as to equalize the volatilities of the three 
components, i.e., in inverse proportion to their volatility, thereby preventing any of them from 
dominating the index of speculative market pressure. For instance, the variance weighted 
factor for the nominal exchange rate is equal to: 
 
∑ + +
=
2 2 2
2
1 1 1
1
s r e
e
e w
σ σ σ
σ
 (2) 
 
Therefore, the variance weighted index of speculative market pressure is specified as: 
  it s it r it e
w
it s w r w e w SMP + + ≡  (3) 
while in the following the superscript w is dropped for clarity. 
To get an idea of any possible dynamic effects that might take place after the agencies’ 
sovereign credit ratings actions, event studies commonly used in the finance literature are 
employed. The event study methodology furthermore allows the examination of the 
perception that credit rating agencies behave pro-cyclically, that is upgrading countries during 
flourishing financial market conditions and lowering them in times of financial turbulence. 
For that reason, the movements of the speculative market pressure index around the time of 
the sovereign credit rating changes are analyzed. 
Standard event study methodology requires linking sovereign credit rating events to 
abnormal movements in the index, which is given as the difference between model-generated  
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and actual market movements. The model-generated movement 
________
it SMP  which depends on the 
actual movements of the speculative market pressure index 
m
it SMP  is given by 
  it
m
it i i it SMP SMP ε β α + + =
________
 (4) 
with E 0 ] [ = it ε  and Var
2 ] [
i it ε σ ε = . However, the coefficients for model-generated 
movements have to be calculated for periods free of sovereign credit rating events. But since 
the relevant time series of sovereign credit ratings are much too short to calculate the 
coefficients within an event-free period, CAMPBELL, LO AND MACKINLAY (1997) proposes 
that  i α  have to be constrained to zero and  i β  to one. 
As a consequence, the abnormal movements of the speculative market pressure index 
a
it SMP  are given in analogy to market-adjusted yield spreads as the difference between the 
model-generated movements and the actual variations: 
 
m
it it
a
it SMP SMP SMP − = ∆
________
 (5) 
This implies that the event study is based on the observed “foreign exchange spreads” 
between the domestic nominal exchange rates and the US dollar. In the case of short-term 
interest rates, the yield spreads between the domestic and the benchmark US short-term 
interest rates are exercised, while in the case of stock market indexes the “stock spreads” 
between domestic stock market indexes and the US S&P500 stock market index are utilized. 
To perform event studies, “clean events” are necessary, that means that sovereign credit 
rating actions do not overlap. This distinction is important when considering an event 
window, in order to be able to isolate the effect of each sovereign credit rating. In the 
following, the sovereign rating effects will be examined ten days before and ten days after the 
event. As Figure 1 illustrates, the event is defined as day-zero, the period between the days 0 
to +1 is defined as the event window, the period from the days − 10 to − 1 as the pre-
announcement window, and the period from the days +2 to +11 as the post-announcement 
window.  
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Figure 1:  The Event Window 
The event window is defined somewhat wider than just one day, because there is no 
exact information available on the announcement time of the sovereign credit rating action by 
the agencies and hence it is not possible to determine whether the announcement was done 
during trading or after trading on a given day. The index of speculative market pressure is set 
to 100 at day − 10, once appropriate sovereign credit rating events are identified, in a way that 
it is more comfortable to measure the cumulative sovereign credit rating effects over time and 
at the same time, to compare different variations of the SMP across the emerging market 
economies. 
In addition to the event studies of dynamic effects following the agencies’ sovereign 
credit rating actions, the contemporaneous effects of sovereign credit rating changes on the 
speculative market pressure index are also quite significant. Furthermore, recent empirical 
studies have focused on the relationship between emerging markets’ capital inflows or foreign 
exchange reserves and interest rates in financial centers, for example EICHENGREEN AND 
MODY (1998) and CALVO AND REINHART (2000), while others have analyzed the links 
between financial market returns in emerging market economies and returns in financial 
centers, for instance CALVO (1999) and KAMINSKY AND SCHMUKLER (2002). 
The following panel regression analysis examines the reaction of the speculative 
market pressure index to changes in sovereign credit ratings and changes of US short-term 
interest rates. The fact that the empirical study uses daily data does not allow controlling for 
the countries’ economic fundamentals, which are in general reported on a lower frequency 
basis. Nevertheless, it will be controlled for past movements of the explanatory variable 
it SMP ∆ . The specification results show that a first-order autoregressive process is sufficient, 
since further lags appear to be insignificant.  
The resulting specification I is given by the pooled panel: 
  it
US
t it it it r R SMP SMP ε δ γ β α + ∆ + ∆ + ∆ + = ∆ − 1  (6)  
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The sub-indexes i and t identify country and time, respectively. The error term  it ε  is 
characterized by an independently distributed random variable with mean zero and variance 
2
it σ . The coefficients α , β , γ  and δ  of equation (6) are estimated via ordinary least squares 
(OLS), allowing for heteroscedastical residuals.  
The variable  it R ∆  stands for the change in sovereign credit ratings. It is equal to 1 if 
there is a positive sovereign credit rating announcement by the agencies, equal to − 1 when 
there is a negative sovereign credit rating announcement and equal to zero otherwise. If 
changes in sovereign credit ratings pass on new information to market participants, it is 
expected that  0 ˆ < γ , which means that sovereign credit rating downgrades lead to increases in 
the index of speculative market pressure. 
The variable 
US
t r ∆  represents changes in US short-term interest rates, that is the interest 
given through 100 times  ) 1 log(
US
t r + . There are at least two probable transmission channels 
through which variations in US interest rates might have an effect on emerging markets’ 
sovereign risk. Firstly, GERTLER AND ROGOFF (1990) emphasize that a rise in US interest rates 
increases the burden of the emerging markets’ outstanding debt, thereby decreasing the 
countries’ repayment capability. Secondly, increases in US interest rates can lessen 
institutional investors’ “appetite for risk”, thereby reducing the demand for risky high-yield 
assets from emerging market economies and, as a result, increasing the sovereign risk of these 
countries (see, for example, EICHENGREEN AND MODY (1998)). For these reasons it is 
expected that  0 ˆ > δ , since increases in US short-term interest rates may lead to a higher index 
of speculative market pressure. 
The alternative specification II which allows discriminating the magnitudes of the 
rating effects between implemented and imminent sovereign credit rating actions is given by 
the pooled panel 
  it
US
t
P
it
P I
it
I
it it r R R SMP SMP ε δ γ γ β α + ∆ + ∆ + + ∆ + = ∆ − 1  (7) 
where all variables have the same meaning as above, while 
I
it R  stands for the im-
plemented sovereign credit rating changes and 
P
it R  indicates the imminent (potential) 
sovereign credit rating actions, that are the rating outlooks and credit watches by the credit 
rating agencies. As in the previous specification, the coefficients of Equation (7) are estimated 
using OLS, thereby allowing for heteroscedastical residuals. 
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III.3 Data 
The data set consists of daily sovereign credit ratings of long-term foreign currency debt 
which have been assigned by the two major credit rating agencies, S&P and Moody’s. The 
observed period between January 1, 1997, and December 31, 2000 fully captures the financial 
market turmoil in the latter half of the 1990s, i.e., the financial market crises in Southeast 
Asia, Russia and Brazil. In the case of S&P, the sovereign credit rating history was obtained 
directly from its historical database on the Internet. However, in the case of Moody’s, the 
press releases about its sovereign credit rating actions had to be collated and checked over the 
full four years to construct its sovereign credit rating history. 
In total, a sample of 302 sovereign credit rating announcements assigned by the two 
agencies for the 28 countries in the sample during the period between January 1, 1997 and 
December 31, 2000 has been gathered. 69 of the credit rating agencies’ announcements report 
actual sovereign credit rating downgrades and 43 actual upgrades, 42 sovereign credit ratings 
were assigned a negative rating outlook and 28 a positive rating outlook, 30 times sovereigns 
were put on negative credit watch and 14 times on positive credit watch, while the remainder 
contained sovereign credit rating confirmations or first assignments. A detailed illustration of 
the sovereign credit rating actions for all 28 emerging market countries employed in the 
empirical analysis during this period is presented in Table A4 in the Appendix. 
Although the credit rating agencies use different symbols in assessing sovereign credit 
risk, every S&P’s symbol has its counterpart in Moody’s sovereign credit rating scale. This 
correspondence allows comparison of the sovereign credit ratings assigned by the two 
agencies. Moreover, it permits a linear transformation of the agencies’ ordinal sovereign 
credit rating scales into numbers (see Table A5 in the Appendix). This linear transformation 
implies that a higher sovereign credit rating denotes a lower probability of (selective) default. 
As discussed above, the effect of a sovereign credit rating change is often partially incorpo-
rated into the institutional investor’s credit risk judgments when the country is placed on 
review for a possible upgrade or a possible downgrade. In order to consider not only the 
implemented long-term foreign currency debt rating changes but also the credit rating 
agencies’ imminent rating actions, the numerical scale of the transformed sovereign credit 
ratings also contains positive and negative rating outlooks and credit watches. 
The obtained sovereign credit rating history indicates that countries with a positive 
(negative) credit watch have never been downgraded (upgraded) at the next sovereign credit 
rating change. Moreover, about 60 percent of all credit watches in the sample have resulted in  
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a sovereign credit rating change in the expected direction. As a result, the consideration of 
imminent sovereign credit rating actions is realized by adding 0.3 of one rating-notch for a 
positive credit watch by S&P and Moody’s and by adding − 0.3 of one rating-notch for a 
negative credit watch to the implemented sovereign credit rating. A positive rating outlook by 
S&P and Moody’s is considered by adding 0.15 of one rating-notch, while a negative rating 
outlook by S&P and Moody’s is taken into account by adding − 0.15 to the implemented 
sovereign credit rating. 
The other three types of data needed to build the speculative market pressure index are 
the daily nominal exchange rates, short-term interest rates and stock market price indexes. In 
the case of short-term interest rates overnight interbank interest rates are employed since the 
overnight interest (call) rate, i.e., the interest rate on the interbank market, is the typically 
watched indicator of liquidity conditions in the money market (see, for example, 
BORENSZTEIN AND LEE (2002)). In the case of stock markets the major national stock indexes 
are used, which are measured for each country in US dollars to enable comparison of stock 
market returns across countries in the same unit of account. All these three types of data were 
obtained from Bloomberg L.P., with holidays and weekends excluded. In case of missing 
values, the data were obtained from Datastream and from the websites of the emerging market 
economies’ respective central banks. 
Table 2 illustrates that the sample used in this study consists of 28 emerging and transi-
tion economy countries, while the inclusion criterion is that the sovereigns have to be rated 
both by S&P and Moody’s throughout the period between January 1, 1997 and December 31, 
2000. However, in the cases of Ecuador, Peru and Egypt, a country is employed in the 
empirical analysis when the sovereign is first rated by either S&P or Moody’s. When the 
other credit rating agency also starts assessing this country, the averages of the adjustments of 
the sovereign credit ratings by both agencies are employed. Table  A1 in the Appendix 
indicates that when the credit rating agencies disagreed in their overall risk level assigned to 
an emerging market country, their sovereign credit ratings in most cases differed by only one 
rating-notch.  
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Table 2  Emerging Market Countries Employed in the Empirical Study 
IMF  Country  S&P  Moody’s  Stock Market Index 
186  Turkey  X  X  ISE Nat 100 
199  South Africa  X  X  JSE All Share 
213 Argentina  X  X  General 
223 Brazil  X  X  Bovespa 
228 Chile  X  X  IPSA 
233 Colombia  X  X  IBB  General 
248 Ecuador  07/29/00 07/24/97  ECGUB 
273 Mexico  X  X  IPC 
293 Peru  12/18/97 X  Lima  General 
299 Venezuela  X  X  IBC 
469 Egypt  01/15/97 X  CMA 
532  Hong Kong SAR  X  X  Hang Seng 
534  India  X  X  BSE Sensex 30 
536 Indonesia  X  X  Jakarta  Composite 
542  South Korea  X  X  Seoul Composite 
548 Malaysia  X  X  KLSE  Composite 
564 Pakistan  X  X  Karachi  100 
566  The Philippines  X  X  PSE Composite 
576 Singapore  X  X  Straits  Times 
578 Thailand  X  X  Bangkok  SET 
686  Morocco  03/02/98  03/02/98  CASA CSG 25 
922 Russia  X  X  Moscow  Times 
924 China  X  X  Shanghai  A 
935  Czech Rep.  X  X  PX 50 
936 Slovak  Rep.  X  X  SAX 
944 Hungary  X  X  Bux 
964 Poland  X  X  Wig 
9998 Taiwan  X  X  Taiwan  Weighted 
 
Table 2 shows that the sample contains 11 Asian economies (China, Hong Kong SAR, 
India, Indonesia, South Korea, Malaysia, Pakistan, the Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan and 
Thailand), eight Latin American economies (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador,  
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Mexico, Peru and Venezuela), five Eastern European (Transition) economies (the Czech 
Republic, Hungary, Poland, Russia and the Slovak Republic), three African/Middle East 
economies (Egypt, Morocco and South Africa) and Turkey. Therefore, the empirical study 
analyzes exactly those countries which are classified by The Economist and the Financial 
Times as emerging market economies as of January 1997, with the exception of Israel. 
Table 3 provides some useful measures of financial market stability in the sample. 
Table 3:  Sample Statistics 
Log Change in Variable  Mean  Median  Min  Max  SD 
Nominal Exchange Rate  0.0184  0.0155  0.0000  0.4241  0.0213 
Stock  Market  Index  0.0142 0.0098  0.0000 0.3865 0.0167 
Overnight  Interest  Rate  0.0219 0.0164  0.0000 0.4773 0.0258 
SMP  Index  0.0177 0.0143  0.0000 0.0435 0.0201 
 
It shows that daily variations in absolute values are large in all three separate financial 
markets and oscillate around 1.8 percent for nominal exchange rates, around 1.4 percent for 
stock market indexes and around 2.2 percent for overnight interest rates, thereby resulting in a 
daily average movement in absolute value of about 1.8 percent for the index of speculative 
market pressure. 
 
IV Empirical  Results 
IV.1  Short-Term Impact of Sovereign Credit Actions 
In a test for statistical significance of the dynamic impact of sovereign credit rating changes 
on financial prices in emerging market countries, Table 4 shows the results of the event study 
for the ten trading days before and after the credit rating agencies’ announcement as well as 
for the two-day event window, i.e., day-zero and day +1, for the date of the sovereign credit 
rating action. Since positive sovereign credit rating announcements should be associated with 
a sliding index of speculative market pressure, movements in the index are multiplied by − 1 
for negative sovereign credit rating actions. Table 4 displays the change of the cumulative 
mean of the speculative market pressure index, with the respective t-statistics and the 
significance levels.  
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Table 4:  Short-Term Impact of Sovereign Credit Rating Actions 
Period  Cumulative Mean  
Change of SMP Index 
− 10 to − 11  − 0.019
* 
(− 1.725) 
0 to +11  − 0.013
* 
(− 1.689) 
+2 to +11  − 0.031
* 
(− 1.952) 
 
Table 4 shows a statistically significant rating effect at the ten percent level on the 
speculative market pressure index when all sovereign credit rating announcements are 
combined. Nevertheless, within the announcement window, a sovereign credit rating event 
moves the index of financial market pressure only by 1.3 percent. Adding the significant 
response of the SMP during the ten days after the sovereign credit rating modification, the 
cumulative movement of the speculative market pressure index is as high as 4.4 percent. 
To explore the potential rating effects of sovereign credit rating actions in more detail, 
Table  5 reports the cumulative median changes of the speculative market pressure index 
separately for implemented upgrades and downgrades by the credit rating agencies. 
Table 5:  Short-Term Impact of Implemented Sovereign Credit Rating Changes 
Period Upgrades  Downgrades 
− 10 to − 11  − 0.010 
(− 0.931) 
0.024
** 
(2.083) 
0 to +11  − 0.012
* 
(− 1.836) 
0.031
*** 
(4.514) 
+2 to +11  − 0.013 
(− 0.973) 
0.044
*** 
(3.887) 
 
Table 5 indicates a significant response to implemented sovereign credit rating changes 
with the expected sign in both sub-panels. During the event window and the post-
announcement period, the index of speculative market pressure rises in the case of sovereign  
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credit rating downgrades by accumulated 7.5 percent, while in the case of sovereign credit 
rating upgrades the effect is only − 2.5 percent. Table 5 shows that the event study results are 
significant at the one percent level for downgrades, but sovereign credit rating upgrades are 
significant only at the ten percent level. Moreover, in the pre-announcement period and in the 
ten days after the rating event, there is no significant market response to sovereign credit 
rating upgrades. 
Figure  2 summarizes the results of the event study in some detail for the case of 
sovereign credit rating upgrades and downgrades. 
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Figure 2:   Short-Term Impact of Implemented Sovereign Credit Rating Changes 
Figure  2 illustrates the average cumulative abnormal movements of the speculative 
market pressure index around the time of the implemented sovereign credit rating changes. 
The index is normalized to 100 at day − 10, day-zero is the day of the rating event, the gray 
period illustrates the event window (day-zero to day +1), while day 11 is the end of the post-
announcement period. The empirical results suggest that sovereign credit rating downgrades 
generate a strong financial market reaction, while sovereign credit rating upgrades have a 
much lesser impact on financial markets in emerging market economies. 
In addition to implemented changes in sovereign credit ratings, it is essential to also 
consider the information of imminent sovereign credit rating actions, which are the credit 
rating agencies’ positive and negative credit watches and rating outlooks. Table 6 reports the 
cumulative median changes of the speculative market pressure index separately for the 
imminent positive and imminent negative sovereign credit rating actions by S&P and 
Moody’s throughout the period between January 1997 and December 2000.  
 
 
24
Table 6:  Short-Term Impact of Imminent Sovereign Credit Rating Actions 
Period Positive  Negative 
− 10 to − 11  − 0.026
** 
(− 2.184) 
0.033
** 
(2.114) 
0 to +11  − 0.022
** 
(− 2.077) 
0.044
*** 
(6.152) 
+2 to +11  − 0.019
* 
(− 1.749) 
0.051
*** 
(6.724) 
 
Table 6 indicates a significant response to imminent positive and imminent negative 
sovereign credit rating actions with the expected sign in both sub-panels. The assignment of 
negative rating outlooks and negative credit watches generates a strong market reaction, with 
the index of speculative market pressure rising by over four percent on the sovereign credit 
rating announcement day. Adding the significant response of the SMP during the ten days 
after the negative rating event, the combined move of the speculative market pressure index is 
nearly ten percent around the negative imminent sovereign credit rating action. For positive 
imminent sovereign credit rating actions the event study indicates also strong rating effects. 
The event study results are statistically highly significant at the one percent level for negative 
credit watches and negative rating outlooks, while positive imminent sovereign credit rating 
announcements are significant at the five percent level during the event window. 
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Figure 3:   Short-Term Impact of Imminent Sovereign Credit Rating Actions 
Figure 3 illustrates the results of the event study separately for imminent positive and 
imminent negative sovereign credit rating actions. The empirical findings confirm that as in 
the case for implemented sovereign credit rating changes, the rating effect of negative 
imminent sovereign credit rating actions is stronger than the rating effect of positive rating  
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outlooks and positive credit watches on the financial markets of the emerging markets 
economies. 
Imminent sovereign credit rating actions can also be used to distinguish between anti-
cipated and unanticipated sovereign credit rating changes (see GROPP AND RICHARDS (2001)). 
A sovereign credit rating adjustment that is preceded by a credit watch in the same direction 
should be largely anticipated by the institutional investors and hence should not necessarily be 
associated with a strong reaction in financial market prices. In other words, in order to 
discriminate between anticipated and unanticipated sovereign credit rating events, it is 
necessary to identify whether the sovereign credit rating change occurred after a credit watch 
in the same direction, i.e., whether a sovereign credit rating downgrade occurred after a 
negative credit watch, or if a sovereign credit rating upgrade occurred after a positive credit 
watch. If this is the case, the sovereign credit rating change is identified as being largely 
anticipated by the market participants. 
Table  7 reports the cumulative median changes of the speculative market pressure 
index separately for the anticipated and unanticipated implemented sovereign credit rating 
changes by S&P and Moody’s. 
Table 7:   Short-Term Impact of Anticipated versus Unanticipated Sovereign 
Credit Rating Changes 
Period Anticipated  Unanticipated 
− 10 to − 11  0.003 
(0.375) 
− 0.012
* 
(− 1.693) 
0 to +11  − 0.008 
(− 0.922) 
− 0.043
*** 
(− 4.753) 
+2 to +11  − 0.011 
(− 1.165) 
− 0.054
*** 
(− 3.938) 
 
The results of the event study indicate that unanticipated sovereign credit rating 
changes imply a strong response in financial markets in emerging market economies, with the 
index of speculative market pressure rising by over four percent on the sovereign credit rating 
announcement day. Adding the significant response of the SMP  during the post-
announcement period, the combined rating effect of an unanticipated sovereign credit rating 
change is close to ten percent. However, none of the anticipated upgrades or downgrades by  
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the credit rating agencies is associated with a significant reaction of the speculative market 
pressure index. 
Figure 4 illustrates the different short-term impacts of anticipated and unanticipated 
sovereign credit rating changes, respectively. 
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Figure 4:   Short-Term Impact of Anticipated versus Unanticipated Sovereign  
Credit Rating Changes 
These empirical results indicate that when emerging market sovereigns are put on 
credit watch by the credit rating agencies, market participants anticipate that it is likely that an 
implemented sovereign credit rating change will occur in the expected direction, i.e., a 
sovereign downgrade will follow a negative credit watch, and react accordingly. 
It is apparent that at least some of the abnormal movements in the index of speculative 
market pressure are contaminated, both by news stories and the release of information about 
the sovereign, which became public information simultaneously with the sovereign credit 
rating action. As discussed in Section II, the credit rating agencies’ sovereign risk assessments 
are primarily based on publicly available information such as countries’ levels of foreign debt 
and exchange reserves or political and fiscal constraints. Consequently, as GROPP AND 
RICHARDS (2001) emphasize, the agencies’ sovereign credit rating announcements may be 
largely anticipated by the market participants. 
If this is the case, the financial market reaction may in fact be due to this information 
and not due to the sovereign risk adjustments by the credit rating agencies themselves. This 
implies that the estimated results of the information content of sovereign credit rating actions 
may be biased upward, as the speculative market pressure index may have reacted to other 
news rather than to the changes in sovereign credit ratings. 
For that reason, the following event study will distinguish between contaminated and 
uncontaminated sovereign credit rating actions. The credit rating agencies’ adjustments of  
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sovereign risk are considered as contaminated if there were relevant news stories around the 
event window. According to this definition a sovereign credit rating action is considered as 
uncontaminated when no such news occurred during this announcement period of day-zero 
and day +1. In order to identify contaminated sovereign credit rating actions, news stories in 
Bloomberg L.P. during the event window of the sovereign credit rating actions were scanned 
for news regarding the respective country. If a news story was identified which revealed the 
reasoning for the sovereign credit rating action by the credit rating agencies, this rating event 
is considered as contaminated. 
A relevant news story is found in 181 of the 302 sovereign credit rating events in the 
sample. Table 8 reports the cumulative median changes of the speculative market pressure 
index separately for the contaminated and uncontaminated sovereign credit rating actions by 
the agencies. 
Table 8:  Short-Term Impact of Contaminated versus Uncontaminated  
Sovereign Credit Rating Actions 
Period Contaminated  Uncontaminated 
− 10 to − 11  − 0.013 
(− 0.924) 
− 0.009 
(− 0.744) 
0 to +11  − 0.016
** 
(− 2.141) 
− 0.011
* 
(− 1.836) 
+2 to +11  − 0.024
** 
(− 2.330) 
− 0.018
* 
(− 1.932) 
 
Table  8 displays that the empirical results become less strong in the case of un-
contaminated sovereign credit rating events. But it is not possible to reject at the ten percent 
significance level the presence of significant abnormal movements in the index of speculative 
market pressure, both for the event day and the post-announcement period. In the case of 
contaminated sovereign credit rating actions, there is no significant market reaction 
subsequent to the rating event, while during the event window and the post-announcement 
period the empirical results of the event study are significant at the five percent level. 
Figure 5 illustrates the different rating effects for contaminated and uncontaminated 
sovereign credit rating actions.  
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Figure 5:   Short-Term Impact of Contaminated versus Uncontaminated Sovereign Credit 
Rating Actions 
The empirical results in Figure  5 suggests that although the failure to control for 
contamination may overstate the rating effects of sovereign credit rating actions, there also 
appears to be information contained in the agencies’ sovereign credit rating changes per se. In 
this context, GROPP AND RICHARDS (2001) remark that by excluding all contaminated 
sovereign credit rating events a downward bias would be introduced into the empirical results 
of the event studies, in the sense that the release of this information may have been provoked 
by the expectation of the negative or positive sovereign credit rating action. In other words, 
the country’s officials may not have made this information public had they not known that the 
credit rating agency would be releasing this information in any event. The BANK FOR 
INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS (2000) emphasize that in this regard, credit rating agencies 
may perform a useful public service, by forcing governments and other countries’ authorities 
to release information, especially negative news. 
The most important result which emerges from the event studies is that sovereign credit 
rating actions by the agencies do produce significant financial market responses in emerging 
market economies. Negative sovereign credit rating announcements lead to a rising index of 
speculative market pressure, while implemented upgrades, positive outlooks and positive 
credit watches result in a decreasing SMP. Furthermore, the empirical results of the event 
studies could be interpreted as indicating that credit rating agencies are behaving procycli-
cally. The movements of the index of speculative market pressure in the pre-announcement 
period indicate that the agencies decide to downgrade (upgrade) a sovereign when the SMP 
goes up (down). This empirical evidence seems to support the hypothesis expressed by 
REISEN AND VON MALTZAN (1999) that credit rating agencies may have contributed to 
amplifying the boom-bust cycles in emerging markets lending, thereby intensifying financial 
market crises in the latter half of the 1990s.  
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IV.2  Country Study: Short-Term Impact of Sovereign  
Credit Rating Actions 
In the following the event study approach is also employed for the analysis of separate 
sovereign credit rating actions in emerging market economies. Figure 6 illustrates the impact 
of an adjustment in their respective sovereign credit ratings on the speculative market 
pressure index for Thailand, South Korea, Russia, Brazil, Mexico and South Africa. The event 
windows are chosen so as to consider the most important rating actions on the respective 
sovereigns by the credit rating agencies, thereby trying to analyze “clean events” in order to 
be able to isolate the rating effect of each sovereign credit rating announcement. 
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Figure 6:   Country Study: Short-Term Impact of Sovereign Credit Rating Actions 
Figure 6 defines that in the case of Thailand, day-zero is determined as November 27, 
1997 when Moody’s downgraded Thailand from Baa1 and assigned a negative rating outlook 
to the sovereign’s Baa3 investment-grade credit rating. The movement of the speculative  
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market pressure index indicates that the financial market reaction was strong. However, this 
should not be attributed only to the negative sovereign credit rating actions, because in late 
November 1997 there was a significant amount of other negative news which contaminated 
Moody’s negative sovereign credit rating actions and had a strong impact on the country’s 
creditworthiness (see Table A4 in the Appendix). 
Figure 6 shows that in the case of South Korea the event window is specified around its 
downgrade to below investment-grade by both S&P and Moody’s on December 22, 1997. But 
it is not possible to entirely attribute the strong movement of the speculative market pressure 
index to the negative sovereign credit rating action on South Korea, because as Table A4 in 
the Appendix indicates, on the same day the sovereign credit ratings of Indonesia, Malaysia 
and Thailand were also lowered by Moody’s. 
Day-zero has been chosen in the case of Russia as August 17, 1998 when S&P down-
graded the sovereign from B−  to triple-C and kept a negative rating outlook. Figure 6 points 
out that the impact on the speculative market pressure index seems to be impressive, but 
around these days in mid-August there were many negative sovereign credit rating 
announcements by the agencies. Moreover, it seems implausible that in the case of Russia the 
sovereign credit rating event was uncontaminated by other news. On August 17, 1998 Russia 
devaluated its currency and unilaterally suspended payments on most of its outstanding 
foreign debt.
11 Nonetheless, it was the first time that a transition economy was rated less than 
triple-C+, leading to market participants’ worries of a general sovereign default. 
The fourth emerging market economy to be considered is Brazil. Day-zero is given by 
S&P’s sovereign credit rating downgrade on January 14, 1999, from BB−  to B+, while still 
keeping a negative rating outlook on the country. As Figure 6 shows, the market reaction was 
not as strong as in the sovereign credit rating events of Thailand, South Korea and Russia, 
respectively. As discussed in Kräussl (2003), in the second half of January 1999 the financial 
market pressure on Brazil continued, but the empirical results of the event study seem to 
suggest that this was not due to the negative sovereign credit rating change by S&P. 
For Mexico, day-zero is chosen as February 2, 2000 when Moody’s assigned a positive 
credit watch to the assigned sovereign credit rating of Ba1, implying that Mexico was under 
review for an upgrade to an investment-grade sovereign credit rating. Figure 6 illustrates that 
this positive imminent sovereign credit rating action may have contributed to the positive 
sentiment over the country’s economic future by the market participants, indicated by the 
                                                 
11   See Kräussl (2003) for a detailed discussion of the Russian case.  
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sharply sliding index of speculative market pressure after the positive sovereign credit rating 
announcement. 
Finally, in the case of South Africa, day-zero is determined by Moody’s negative credit 
watch on the sovereign’s investment-grade rating of Baa3 on July 17, 1998 implying that 
South Africa was under review for a lowering of its sovereign credit rating to below 
investment-grade. Figure 6 indicates that this had a strong financial market impact on the 
creditworthiness of the sovereign, as the speculative market pressure index rose more than ten 
percent in the aftermath of the negative sovereign credit rating announcement. 
 
IV.3  Contemporaneous Effects of Sovereign Credit Rating Actions 
The panel regression results for equations (6) and (7) are reported in Table 9 with the respec-
tive t-statistics and significance levels. The panel regression is estimated via OLS with robust 
standard errors, using the White correction for heteroscedasticity. Column 2 presents the 
pooled panel estimation results for specification I, i.e., when both implemented and imminent 
sovereign credit rating actions are considered as one variable, while column 3 displays the 
pooled panel estimation results for specification II, i.e., when the contemporaneous impact for 
the implemented sovereign credit rating changes and for the imminent sovereign credit rating 
actions on the speculative market pressure index are separately examined. 
The empirical results for both specifications indicate that the coefficient for the lagged 
dependent variable is positive and statistically highly significant.
12 The coefficient for the 
changes in sovereign credit ratings is as expected negative and statistically highly significant: 
a negative (positive) sovereign credit rating action increases (decreases) the index of 
speculative market pressure. Nevertheless, this rating effect is smaller than the average daily 
change in the speculative market pressure index: the SMP only varies by 1.1 percent while the 
average absolute movement of the speculative market pressure index in the sample is about 
1.8 percent. 
                                                 
12   PESARAN AND SMITH (1995) mention that the size of the coefficient of the lagged dependent variable in a 
dynamic fixed-effect model might be biased. Nonetheless, the focus lies here on the significance and size of 
the exogenous variables, i.e., the size of the long-run effects is not of primary interest. Moreover, if the fixed-
effect homogeneity restrictions were dropped, the consequence would be a considerable loss of degrees of 
freedom.  
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Table 9:  Panel Regression Results 
Variable  Specification I  Specification II 
Constant  0.000 
(− 0.634) 
0.000 
(− 0.463) 
Lagged SMP  0.107
*** 
(5.332) 
0.107
*** 
(5.301) 
Rating  − 0.011
*** 
(− 3.812) 
 
Implemented Rating    − 0.007
*** 
(− 3.734) 
Imminent Rating    − 0.019
*** 
(− 4.934) 
US Interest Rate  0.036
*** 
(2.958) 
0.036
*** 
(3.027) 
R
2  0.011 0.011 
 
As expected from the theoretical consideration above, the third explanatory variable, 
the US short-term interest rate has the right positive sign and is also statistically highly 
significant. This implies that a rise in US interest rates increases the financial market pressure 
on emerging economies due to a shift by institutional investors from high-yield investments to 
investments in probable “safer haven”. 
Specification II distinguishes explicitly between implemented and imminent sovereign 
credit rating actions by S&P and Moody’s. The negative sign of the coefficients is as 
expected: sovereign credit rating downgrades (upgrades) or negative (positive) rating outlooks 
and negative (positive) credit watches increases (decreases) the index of speculative market 
pressure. Table  9 shows that the rating effect of the agencies’ sovereign upgrade or 
downgrade on the emerging economies’ financial markets is statistically highly significant but 
with 0.7 percent smaller than in specification I, while the impact of rating outlooks and credit 
watches is also statistically highly significant and with 1.9 percent substantially larger than 
the coefficient of implemented sovereign credit rating changes. This seems to suggest that 
market participants anticipate sovereign credit rating changes since countries are typically 
placed on negative (positive) credit watch or are at least assigned a negative (positive) rating  
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outlook before being downgraded (upgraded) by the credit rating agencies (see also the 
empirical results of the event studies above). 
To check for robustness of the event studies and panel regression results, a number of 
alternative specifications based on S&P’s and Moody’s sovereign credit ratings have been 
applied, but none substantially improved the fit. In particular, the sovereign risk assessments 
from only one credit rating agency at a time were included or the higher or the lower 
sovereign credit rating for each country has been selected. 
A kinked function with a structural break instead of the linear transformation has been 
also considered.
13 Another alternative transformation of the sovereign credit rating symbols 
by S&P and Moody’s is the logistic transformation which contains the hypothesis that risk 
perceptions first deteriorate slowly as rating-notches decrease, then deteriorate faster when 
sovereign credit ratings fall from investment-grade to speculative-grade, and finally 
deteriorate slowly again as sovereign risk assessments reach the bottom of the agencies’ 
sovereign credit rating classification. However, both transformations did not change the 
empirical results of the event studies and panel regressions significantly. 
In addition, several assumptions on which the event study is built are tested. 
Econometric tests applying the autocorrelation function (ACF) and the partial autocorrelation 
function (PACF) prove that the time series are not autocorrelated. The augmented Dickey-
Fuller (ADF) test rejected the hypothesis that the time series are integrated of the order one or 
higher. The Jarque-Bera (JB) test could not reject the hypothesis that the time series follow a 
normal distribution in the sample or in any of the sub-samples. Furthermore, in the sample 
and all the sub-samples more than 75 percent of the sovereign credit rating actions have the 
right sign: the speculative market pressure index increases with a negative sovereign credit 
rating action but decreases with a positive sovereign credit rating announcement by the credit 
rating agencies. 
 
                                                 
13  This transformation allows fully capturing the impact when the sovereign passes from investment-grade to 
non-investment-grade by allowing for a numerical change of three rating-notches instead of only one (see 
Table A5 in the Appendix). Additionally, the imminent sovereign credit rating actions between investment-
grade and speculative-grade are also considered with a more heavy weight by adding + (− ) one rating-notch 
for a positive (negative) credit watch, and by adding + (− ) half a rating-notch for a positive (negative) rating 
outlook to the implemented sovereign credit rating.  
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V Conclusion  and  Outlook 
Sovereign credit rating adjustments may convey substantial new information about an 
individual country’s creditworthiness. Credit rating changes for long-term foreign currency 
debt may act as a wake-up call with upgrades and downgrades in one country affecting other 
financial markets within and across national borders. Such a potential rating effect is likely to 
be stronger in emerging market economies, where institutional investors’ problems of 
asymmetric information are more present. Therefore, this empirical study has analyzed the 
role of credit rating agencies in international financial markets. In particular, the specific 
impact of sovereign credit rating changes during the financial turmoil in emerging markets in 
the latter half of the 1990s has been examined. The data set is not only expanded to update 
previous studies but also to test new hypotheses about the implications of sovereign credit 
rating changes on financial markets in emerging economies.  
The results of the empirical study indicate that credit rating agencies have a substantial 
influence on the size and volatility of emerging markets lending. The empirical results are 
significantly stronger in the case of government’s downgrades and negative imminent sover-
eign credit rating actions such as credit watches and rating outlooks than positive adjustments 
by the credit rating agencies while by the market participants’ anticipated sovereign credit 
rating changes have a smaller impact on financial markets in emerging economies. Another 
substantial result of the empirical analysis is that speculative-grade rated emerging market 
economies are more vulnerable to interest rate changes in financial centers.  
 
 
35
References 
 
AZIZ, J., F. CARAMAZZA AND R. SALGADO (2000): “Currency Crises: In Search of Common 
Elements”, IMF Working Paper Series, No. 00/67. 
BANK FOR INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS (2000): “Credit Ratings and the Complementary 
Sources of Credit Quality Information”, BCBS Working Paper Series, No. 3. 
BORENSZTEIN, E. R. AND J.-W. LEE (2002): “Financial Crisis and Credit Crunch in Korea: 
Evidence from Firm-Level Data”, Journal of Monetary Economics, 49 (4), pp. 853-875. 
CALVO, G. A. (1999): “Contagion in Emerging Markets: When Wall Street is a Carrier”, 
Working Paper, University of Maryland, (Version of May 2). 
CALVO, G. A. AND E. G. MENDOZA (2000a): “Contagion, Globalization and the Volatility of 
Capital Flows”, in Capital Flows and the Emerging Economies: Theory, Evidence and 
Controversies, ed. by S. Edwards, chap. 1, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago. 
CALVO, G. A. AND E. G. MENDOZA (2000b): “Rational Contagion and the Globalization of 
Securities Markets”, Journal of International Economics, 51 (1), pp. 79-113. 
CALVO, G. A. AND  C. M. REINHART (2000): “When Capital Inflows Suddenly Stop: 
Consequences and Policy Options”, in Reforming the International Monetary and 
Financial System, ed. by P. B. Kenen and A. K. Swoboda, chap. 5, IMF Publications, 
Washington, D.C. 
CAMPBELL, J. Y., A. W. LO AND A. C. MACKINLAY (1997): The Econometrics of Financial 
Markets, Princeton University Press, Princeton. 
CANTOR, R. AND F. PACKER (1995b): “Sovereign Credit Ratings”, FRBNY Current Issues in 
Economics and Finance, 1 (3), pp. 1-6. 
CANTOR, R. AND F. PACKER (1996): “Determinants and Impact of Sovereign Credit Ratings”, 
The Journal of Fixed Income, 6 (3), pp. 76-91. 
CORSETTI, G., P. PESENTI AND N. ROUBINI (1999): “What Caused the Asian Currency and 
Financial Crisis?”, Japan & the World Economy, 11 (3), pp. 305-373. 
DRAZEN, A. (2003): “Interest Rate Defense Against Speculative Attack as a Signal: A 
Primer”, in Managing Currency Crises in Emerging Markets, ed. by M. P. Dooley and 
J. A. Frankel, chap. 2, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago.  
 
 
36
EICHENGREEN, B. AND A. MODY (1998): “Interest Rates in the North and Capital Flows to the 
South: Is There a Missing Link?”, International Finance, 1 (1), pp. 35-57. 
EICHENGREEN, B., A. K. ROSE AND C. WYPLOSZ (1996): “Contagious Currency Crises”, The 
Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 98 (2), pp. 463-484. 
FERRI, G., L.-G. LIU AND J. E. STIGLITZ (1999): “The Procyclical Role of Rating Agencies: 
Evidence from the East Asian Crisis”, Economic Notes, 28 (3), pp. 335-355. 
FRANKEL, J. A. AND  A. K. ROSE (1996): “Currency Crashes in Emerging Markets: An 
Empirical Treatment”, Journal of International Economics, 41 (3-4), pp. 351-366.  
FRIEDMAN, T. L. (1999): “From Supercharged Financial Markets to Osama Bin Laden: The 
Emerging Global Order Demands a New Enforcer, That’s America’s New Burden”, 
New York Times Magazine, 40 (43), (March 28). 
GERTLER, M. AND  K. ROGOFF (1990): “North-South Lending and Endogenous Domestic 
Capital Market Inefficiencies”, Journal of Monetary Economics, 26 (2), pp. 245-266. 
GROPP, R. AND A. J. RICHARDS (2001): “Rating Agency Actions and the Pricing of Debt and 
Equity of European Banks: What Can We Infer About Private Sector Monitoring of 
Bank Soundness?”, ECB Working Paper Series, No. 76. 
HARTMANN, P., S. STRAETMANS AND C. G. DE VRIES (2001): “Asset Market Linkages in 
Crisis Periods”, ECB Working Paper Series, No. 71. 
KAMINSKY, G. L. AND  S. L. SCHMUKLER (2002): “Emerging Markets Instability: Do 
Sovereign Ratings Affect Country Risk and Stock Returns?”, in Ratings, Rating 
Agencies and the Global Financial System, ed. by R. M. Levich, G. Majnoni and C. M. 
Reinhart, chap. 9, Kluwer, Boston. 
KRÄUSSL, R. (2000): “Sovereign Ratings and Their Impact on Recent Financial Crises”, CFS 
Working Paper Series, No. 2000/04. 
KRÄUSSL, R. (2003): Sovereign Risk, Credit Ratings and the Recent Financial Crises in 
Emerging Markets: Empirical Analysis and Policy Implications, Fritz Knapp Verlag, 
Frankfurt/Main. 
MERRILL LYNCH (1999): “Why Do Bond Rating Agencies Exist?”, Extra Credit, (November). 
MOODY’S INVESTORS SERVICE (1999): “Bond Defaults in Emerging Markets: The Slide Down 
a Slippery Slope”, Special Comment, (August).  
 
 
37
MOODY’S  INVESTORS  SERVICE (2001): “Moody’s Country Credit Statistical Handbook”, 
Global Credit Research, (January). 
OBSTFELD, M. AND  A. M. TAYLOR (2003): “Globalization and Capital Markets”, in 
Globalization in Historical Perspective, ed. by M. D. Bordo, A. M. Taylor and J. G. 
Williamson, chap. 3, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago. 
PARTNOY, F. (2002): “The Paradox of Credit Ratings”, in Ratings, Rating Agencies and the 
Global Financial System, ed. by R. M. Levich, G. Majnoni and C. M. Reinhart, chap. 3, 
Kluwer, Boston. 
PESARAN, M. H. AND R. SMITH (1995): “Estimating Long-Run Relationships from Dynamic 
Heterogeneous Panels”, Journal of Econometrics, 68, pp. 79-113. 
RADELET, S. AND J. D. SACHS (1998): “The East Asian Financial Crisis: Diagnosis, Remedies, 
Prospects”, Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, (1), pp. 1-74. 
REISEN, H. AND  J.  VON  MALTZAN (1999): “Boom and Bust and Sovereign Ratings”, 
International Finance, 2 (2), pp. 273-293. 
STANDARD & POOR’S (1997): “Sovereign Credit Ratings: A Primer”, Credit Week, (April 16). 
STANDARD  & POOR’S (1999): “Rating Dynamics: Focus on Fundamentals”, Credit Week, 
(May 26). 
STANDARD & POOR’S (2000): “Outlooks: The Sovereign Credit Weather Vane”, Credit Week, 
(January 12). 
SYLLA, R. (2002): “An Historical Primer on the Business of Credit Ratings”, in Ratings, 
Rating Agencies and the Global Financial System, ed. by R. M. Levich, G. Majnoni and 
C. M. Reinhart, chap. 1, Kluwer, Boston. 
WHITE, L. J. (2002): “The Credit Rating Industry: An Industrial Organization Analysis”, in 
Ratings, Rating Agencies and the Global Financial System, ed. by R. M. Levich, G. 
Majnoni and C. M. Reinhart, chap. 2, Kluwer, Boston. 
WYPLOSZ, C. (1998): “Globalized Financial Markets and Financial Crises”, in Regulatory and 
Supervisory Challenges in a New Era of Global Finance, ed. by J. J. Teunissen, chap. 3, 
FONDAD, Amsterdam. 
  
 
 
38
Appendix 
 
Table A1:  S&P’s Sovereign Credit Rating Criteria 
Political Risk  •   Form of government and adaptability of political  
institutions 
•   Extent of popular participation 
•   Orderliness of leadership succession 
•   Degree of consensus on economic policy objectives 
•   Integration in global trade and financial system 
•   Internal and external security risks 
Income and Eco-
nomic Structure 
•   Living standards, income, and wealth distribution 
•   Market versus non-market economy 
•   Resources endowments and degree of diversification 
Economic Growth 
Prospects 
•   Size and composition of savings and investment 
•   Rate and pattern of economic growth 
Fiscal Flexibility  •   General government operating and total budget balances 
•   Tax competitiveness and tax-raising flexibility 
•   Spending pressures 
Public Debt Burden  •   General government financial assets 
•   Public debt and interest burden 
•   Currency composition and structure of public debt 
•   Pension liabilities 
•   Banking, corporate and other contingent liabilities 
Price Stability  •   Trends in price inflation 
•   Rates of money and credit growth 
•   Exchange rate policy 
•   Degree of central bank autonomy 
Balance of Payments 
Flexibility 
•   Impact of fiscal and monetary policies on external accounts 
•   Structure of the current account 
•   Composition of capital flows 
External Debt and 
Liquidity 
•   Size and currency composition of public external debt 
•   Importance of banks, public and private entities as contin-
gent liabilities 
•   Maturity structure and debt service burden 
•   Level and composition of reserves and other public  
external assets 
•   Debt service track record 
Source: Standard & Poor’s (1997) 
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Table A2:  S&P’s Long-Term Issuer Sovereign Credit Rating Scale 
Rating Category  Definition 
AAA  An obligor rated AAA has extremely strong capacity to meet its fi-
nancial commitments. AAA is the highest Issuer Credit Rating as-
signed by S&P’s. 
AA  An obligor rated AA has very strong capacity to meet its financial 
commitments. It differs from the highest-rated obligors only in 
small degree. 
A  An obligor rated A has strong capacity to meet its financial com-
mitments but is somewhat more susceptible to the adverse effects of 
changes in circumstances and economic conditions than obligors in 
higher-rated categories. 
BBB  An obligor rated BBB has adequate capacity to meet its financial 
commitments. However, adverse economic conditions or changing 
circumstances are more likely to lead to a weakened capacity of the 
obligor to meet its financial commitments. 
BB  An obligor rated BB is less vulnerable in the near term than other 
lower-rated obligors. However, it faces major ongoing uncertainties 
and exposure to adverse business, financial, or economic conditions 
which could lead to the obligor’s inadequate capacity to meet its fi-
nancial commitments. 
B  An obligor rated B is more vulnerable than the obligors rated BB, 
but the obligor currently has the capacity to meet its financial com-
mitments. Adverse business, financial, or economic conditions will 
likely impair the obligor’s capacity or willingness to meet its finan-
cial commitments. 
CCC  An obligor rated CCC is currently vulnerable, and is dependent 
upon favorable business, financial, and economic conditions to meet 
its financial commitments. 
CC  An obligor rated CC is currently highly vulnerable. 
SD  An obligor rated SD is in selective default. 
Source: STANDARD & POOR’S (2000)  
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Table A3:  Moody’s Long-Term Issuer Sovereign Credit Rating Scale 
Rating Category  Definition 
Aaa  Issuers rated Aaa offer exceptional financial security. While the 
creditworthiness of these entities is likely to change, such changes 
as can be visualized are most unlikely to impair their fundamen-
tally strong position. 
Aa  Issuers rated Aa offer exceptional financial security. Together with 
the Aaa group, they constitute what are generally known as high 
grade entities. They are rated lower than Aaa entities because 
long-term risks appear somewhat larger. 
A  Issuers rated A offer good financial security. However, elements 
may be present which suggest a susceptibility to impairment 
sometime in the future. 
Baa  Issuers rated Baa offer adequate financial security. However, cer-
tain protective elements may be lacking or may be unreliable over 
any great period of time. 
Ba  Issuers rated Ba offer questionable financial security. Often the 
ability of these entities to meet obligations may be moderate and 
not well safeguarded in the future. 
B  Issuers rated B offer poor financial security. Assurance of payment 
of obligations over any long period of time is small. 
Caa  Issuers rated Caa offer very poor financial security. They may be 
in default on their obligations or there may be present elements of 
danger with respect to punctual payment of obligations. 
Ca  Issuers rated Ca offer extremely poor financial security. Such en-
tities are often in default on their obligations or have other market 
shortcomings. 
C  Issuers rated C are the lowest rated class of entity, are usually in 
default on their obligations, and potential recovery values are low. 
Source: MOODY’S INVESTORS SERVICE (2001)  
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Table A4:  S&P’s and Moody’s Emerging Market Sovereign Credit Rating History  
(January 1997 to December 2000) 
IMF Country  Date  S&P Moody’s 
186  Turkey  01/01/1997  B (N)  Ba3 (N) 
   01/09/1997    Ba3 (CW− ) 
   03/13/1997    B1  (N) 
   08/10/1998  B  (O+)   
   01/21/1999  B  (N)   
   11/30/1999    B1  (O+) 
   12/10/1999  B  (O+)   
   04/25/2000  B+  (O+)   
   07/24/2000    B1  (CW+) 
   12/05/2000  B+  (N)   
   12/22/2000    B1  (N) 
199  South Africa  01/01/1997  BB+ (O+)  Baa3 (N) 
   03/06/1998  BB+  (N)   
   07/17/1998    Baa3 (CW− ) 
   10/02/1998    Baa3  (N) 
   02/07/2000    Baa3  (O+) 
   02/25/2000  BBB−  (N)   
213 Argentina  01/01/1997  BB−  (N)  B1 (N) 
   04/02/1997  BB  (N)   
   10/02/1997    Ba3  (N) 
   09/03/1998    Ba3 (CW− ) 
   02/10/1999    Ba3 (O− ) 
   07/22/1999  BB (O− )   
   08/20/1999    Ba3 (CW− ) 
   10/06/1999    B1  (N) 
   02/10/2000  BB  (N)   
   10/31/2000  BB (CW− )   
   11/14/2000  BB−  (N)   
   11/21/2000    B1 (O− ) 
223  Brazil  01/01/1997  B+ (O+)  B1 (N) 
   04/02/1997  BB−  (N)   
   06/08/1998    B1 (O− ) 
   09/03/1998    B2  (N) 
   09/10/1998  BB−  (O− )   
   01/14/1999  B+ (O− )   
   11/09/1999  B+  (N)   
   02/29/2000  B+  (O+)   
   08/17/2000    B2  (CW+) 
   10/16/2000    B1  (CW+) 
228 Chile  01/01/1997  A−  (N)  Baa1 (N) 
233 Colombia  01/01/1997  BBB−  (O+)  Baa3 (N) 
   10/07/1997  BBB−  (N)    
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233 Colombia  05/21/1998    Baa3 (O− ) 
   09/30/1998    Baa3 (CW− ) 
   12/18/1998    Baa3 (O− ) 
   06/09/1999    Baa3 (CW− ) 
   06/11/1999  BBB−  (O− )   
   08/11/1999    Ba2  (N) 
   09/21/1999  BB+  (N)   
   04/10/2000  BB+ (O− )   
   05/23/2000  BB (O− )   
248  Ecuador  01/01/1997  n. r.  n. r. 
   07/24/1997    B1  (N) 
   04/17/1998    B1 (O− ) 
   06/08/1998    B1 (CW− ) 
   09/14/1998    B3  (N) 
   10/05/1999    Caa2  (N) 
   07/29/2000  SD   
   08/28/2000  B−  (N)   
273 Mexico  01/01/1997  BB  (N)  Ba2  (N) 
   09/02/1997  BB  (O+)   
   09/03/1998    Ba2 (CW− ) 
   10/02/1998  BB  (N)   
   02/10/1999    Ba2 (O− ) 
   06/09/1999    Ba2  (N) 
   06/21/1999    Ba2  (CW+) 
   08/10/1999    Ba1  (O+) 
   09/02/1999  BB  (O+)   
   02/02/2000    Ba1  (CW+) 
   03/07/2000    Baa3  (N) 
   03/10/2000  BB+  (O+)   
293  Peru  01/01/1997  n. r.  B2 (N) 
   12/18/1997  BB  (N)   
   01/13/1998    B2  (O+) 
   02/13/1998    B2  (CW+) 
   03/27/1998    Ba3  (N) 
   05/19/2000  BB (CW− )   
   06/15/2000  BB  (N)   
   10/31/2000  BB−  (N)   
   12/12/2000    Ba3 (O− ) 
299  Venezuela  01/01/1997  B (O+)  Ba2 (N) 
   06/05/1997  B+  (N)   
   02/12/1998    Ba2 (O− ) 
   05/08/1998    Ba2 (CW− ) 
   07/22/1998    B1  (N) 
   08/31/1998  B+ (O− )   
   09/03/1998    B2  (N) 
   12/21/1999  B  (N)   
469  Egypt  01/01/1997  n. r.  Ba2 (N)  
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469 Egypt  01/15/1997  BBB−  (N)   
   08/12/1997    Ba2  (O+) 
   10/01/1997    Ba2  (CW+) 
   11/14/1997    Ba1  (N) 
   07/03/2000  BBB−  (O− )   
532  Hong Kong SAR  01/01/1997  A (O+)  A3 (N) 
   05/14/1997  A+  (N)   
   02/18/1998    A3 (O− ) 
   06/22/1998  A+ (CW− )   
   08/31/1998  A (O− )   
   09/03/1998    A3 (CW− ) 
   05/24/1999    A3  (N) 
   12/07/1999  A  (N)   
534 India  01/01/1997  BB+  (O+)  Baa3  (N) 
   10/06/1997  BB+  (N)   
   01/08/1998    Baa3 (CW− ) 
   05/22/1998  BB+ (O− )   
   06/19/1998    Ba2  (N) 
   10/22/1998  BB  (N)   
   10/06/1999    Ba2  (O+) 
   03/20/2000  BB  (O+)   
   10/10/2000  BB  (N)   
536 Indonesia  01/01/1997  BBB  (N) Baa3  (N) 
   10/10/1997  BBB−  (N)   
   10/27/1997    Baa3 (O− ) 
   12/22/1997    Ba1  (N) 
   12/31/1997  BB+ (O− )   
   01/09/1998  BB (CW− )   
   01/27/1998  B (CW− )   
   03/11/1998  B−  (CW− )   
   03/20/1998    B3  (N) 
   05/15/1998  CCC+ (CW− )   
   07/08/1998  CCC+ (O− )   
   03/30/1999  SD   
   03/31/1999  CCC+  (N)   
   09/13/1999  CCC+ (CW− )   
   12/15/1999    B3  (O+) 
   04/17/2000  SD   
   10/02/2000  B−  (N)   
542 South  Korea 01/01/1997  AA−  (N)  A1 (N) 
   08/05/1997    A1 (O− ) 
   08/06/1997  AA−  (O− )   
   10/24/1997  A+ (O− )   
   11/25/1997  A−  (CW− )   
   11/27/1997    A3  (N) 
   12/10/1997    Baa2 (CW− ) 
   12/11/1997  BBB−  (CW− )    
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542 South  Korea 12/22/1997  B+ (CW− )  Ba1 (N) 
   01/09/1998    Ba1 (CW− ) 
   02/18/1998  BB+  (N)   
   03/30/1998    Ba1  (N) 
   12/18/1998    Ba1  (CW+) 
   01/04/1999  BB+  (O+)   
   01/25/1999  BBB−  (O+)   
   02/12/1999    Baa3  (O+) 
   08/23/1999    Baa3  (CW+) 
   11/11/1999  BBB  (O+)   
   12/16/1999    Baa2  (N) 
548  Malaysia  01/01/1997  A+ (O+)  A1 (N) 
   08/18/1997  A+  (N)   
   09/25/1997  A+ (O− )   
   12/22/1997    A2  (N) 
   12/23/1997  A (O− )   
   02/05/1998    A2 (O− ) 
   04/17/1998  A−  (N)   
   06/04/1998    A2 (CW− ) 
   07/23/1998    Baa2  (N) 
   07/24/1998  BBB+ (O− )   
   09/14/1998    Baa3 (CW− ) 
   09/15/1998  BBB−  (O− )   
   12/01/1998    Baa3 (O− ) 
   03/31/1999  BBB−  (N)   
   04/20/1999    Baa3  (N) 
   06/10/1999    Baa3  (O+) 
   11/11/1999  BBB  (N)   
   07/12/2000    Baa3  (CW+) 
   09/01/2000  BBB  (O+)   
   10/17/2000    Baa2  (N) 
564  Pakistan  01/01/1997  B+ (N)  B2 (N) 
   01/14/1998  B+ (O− )   
   05/22/1998  B+ (CW− )   
   05/28/1998    B3  (N) 
   06/01/1998  B−  (CW− )   
   07/14/1998  CCC (CW− )   
   10/12/1998  CCC−  (O− )   
   10/23/1998    Caa1  (N) 
   12/03/1998  CC (O− )   
   01/29/1999  SD   
   12/21/1999  B−  (N)   
566 The  Philippines  01/01/1997  BB−  (O+)  Ba2 (N) 
   01/23/1997    Ba2  (CW+) 
   02/21/1997  BB+  (O+)   
   05/19/1997    Ba1  (N) 
   09/25/1997  BB+  (N)   
   02/23/1998  BB+ (O− )    
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566  The Philippines  01/06/1999  BB+ (N)   
   10/19/2000  BB+ (O− )   
   10/27/2000    Ba1 (O− ) 
576  Singapore  01/01/1997  AAA (N)  Aa1 (N) 
578  Thailand  01/01/1997  A (N)  A2 (N) 
   02/13/1997    A2 (CW− ) 
   04/08/1997    A3  (N) 
   07/24/1997    A3  (O+) 
   08/01/1997  A (CW− )   
   09/03/1997  A−  (O− )   
   09/09/1997    A3 (CW− ) 
   10/01/1997    Baa1 (O− ) 
   10/24/1997  BBB (O− )   
   11/27/1997    Baa3 (O− ) 
   12/22/1997    Ba1  (N) 
   01/08/1998  BBB−  (O− )   
   05/03/1999    Ba1  (O+) 
   05/05/1999  BBB−  (N)   
   04/03/2000    Ba1  (CW+) 
   06/22/2000    Baa3  (N) 
686  Morocco  01/01/1997  n. r.  n. r. 
   03/02/1998  BB  (N)  Ba1  (N) 
922 Russia  01/01/1997  BB−  (N)  Ba2 (N) 
   12/19/1997  BB−  (O− )   
   02/03/1998    Ba2 (CW− ) 
   03/11/1998    Ba3  (N) 
   05/27/1998  BB−  (CW− )   
   05/29/1998    B1  (N) 
   06/09/1998  B+  (N)   
   08/13/1998  B−  (O− )  B2 (N) 
   08/17/1998  CCC (O− )   
   08/21/1998    B3  (N) 
   09/16/1998  CCC−  (O− )   
   01/27/1999  SD   
   04/10/2000    B3  (O+) 
   08/23/2000    B3  (CW+) 
   11/13/2000    B2  (N) 
   12/08/2000  B−  (N)   
924  China  01/01/1997  BBB (O+)  A3 (N) 
   05/14/1997  BBB+  (N)   
   02/19/1998    A3 (O− ) 
   07/16/1998  BBB+ (O− )   
   09/03/1998    A3 (CW− ) 
   12/03/1998    A3  (N) 
   07/21/1999  BBB  (N)   
935  Czech Rep.  01/01/1997  A (N)  Baa1 (N) 
   11/05/1998  A−  (N)    
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936 Slovak  Rep. 01/01/1997  BBB−  (N)  Baa3 (N) 
   11/03/1997    Baa3 (O− ) 
   01/20/1998    Baa3 (CW− ) 
   03/30/1998    Ba1  (N) 
   04/07/1998  BBB−  (O− )   
   09/17/1998  BB+ (O− )   
   10/01/1998    Ba1 (CW− ) 
   02/18/1999    Ba1 (O− ) 
   10/27/1999    Ba1  (N) 
   11/12/1999  BB+  (N)   
   11/07/2000    Ba1  (O+) 
   11/09/2000  BB+  (O+)   
944 Hungary  01/01/1997  BBB−  (N)  Baa3 (N) 
   11/05/1997    Baa3  (O+) 
   01/22/1998  BBB−  (O+)   
   03/20/1998    Baa3  (CW+) 
   05/08/1998    Baa2  (O+) 
   12/11/1998  BBB  (O+)   
   06/25/1999    Baa1  (N) 
   02/02/2000  BBB+  (O+)   
   04/10/2000    Baa1  (O+) 
   09/13/2000    Baa1  (CW+) 
   11/14/2000    A3  (N) 
   12/19/2000  A−  (N)   
964 Poland  01/01/1997  BBB−  (N)  Baa3 (N) 
   06/03/1997  BBB−  (O+)   
   12/03/1998    Baa3  (O+) 
   06/10/1999  BBB  (O+)   
   09/02/1999    Baa1  (N) 
   05/15/2000  BBB+  (N)   
9998  Taiwan  01/01/1997  AA+ (N)  Aa3 (N) 
   12/06/2000  AA+ (O− )   
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Table A5:  Linear Transformation of Sovereign Credit Rating Scales 
S&P  Moody’s  Linear Scale  Structural Break 
AAA Aaa  20  22 
AA+ Aa1  19  21 
AA Aa2  18  20 
AA−   Aa3 17  19 
A+ A1 16  18 
A A2 15 17 
A−   A3 14 16 
BBB+ Baa1  13  15 
BBB Baa2  12  14 
BBB−   Baa3 11  13 
BB+ Ba1  10  10 
BB Ba2  9  9 
BB−   Ba3 8  8 
B+ B1  7  7 
B B2 6  6 
B−   B3 5  5 
CCC+ Caa1  4  4 
CCC Caa2  3  3 
CCC−   Caa3 2  2 
CC Ca  1  1 
SD C  0  0 
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